(141)

EXERCISE

IVORY HUNTER

74

FINAL REPORT
ANALYSIS-EVALUATION

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DOC 2

JBM 313 1976

17 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75 Final Report--
          Analysis and Evaluation

1. Annex G, JCS EXPLAN 0007, 1 August 1975, levied the
requirement for conducting the analysis and evaluation of
Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75.

2. The attached report is an analysis of selected systems
and procedures that were exercised during IVORY HUNTER 75.
The primary thrust of the analysis was to measure the
effectiveness of the Command and Control System and proce-
dures that provide the NCA/Joint Chiefs of Staff and their
staffs with the means of monitoring and controlling a
crisis situation.

3. Analysis of command post exercises provides information
with which both exercise design and execution of established
procedures can be evaluated, and where appropriate, im-
provements undertaken. It is suggested that participants
review this report in that light.

4. Without attachment, this memorandum is unclassified.

RAY B. SITTON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations

Attachment   Classified by Chief, EP&A Div
a/s   SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
                    SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
                    AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT
                    TWO YEAR INTERVALS
                    DECLASSIFIED ON

.DISTRIBUTION

AGENCY	NO. COPIES
STATE	1
OSD	1
SJCS	1
CJCS	1
DJS	1
ARMY	5
NAVY	5
USAF	5
USMC	5
USCG	2
CINCLANT	1
CINCNORAD	1
USCINCEUR	1
CINCPAC	10
USCINCRED	5
USCINCSOUTH	1
CINCSAC	1
CIA	1
FPA	1
DMA	1
DNA	1
DCA	5
DCPA	1
DIA	1
DSA	1
USIA	1
NSA/CSS	1
NCS	1
J-1	1
J-3	40
J-4	2
J-5	2
J-6	1
SAGA	1
NMCC	1
NMCSSC	1
DAS	1
ANMCC	1
DSAA	1

FINAL REPORT

ANALYSIS-EVALUATION

EXERCISE IVORY HUNTER 75

PREPARED BY:
  OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE ANALYSIS BRANCH
  EXERCISE PLANS AND ANALYSIS DIVISION
  OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (J-3)
  OJCS

J3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

ABCCC	AIRBORNE BATTLEFIELD COMMAND CONTROL CENTER
ABN	AIRBORNE
ACP	ALLIED COMMUNICATION PUBLICATION
AD	ADVANCED DEPLOYABILITY
ADDO	ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ADP	AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
AFAA	ADMINISTRATOR FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
AFB	AIR FORCE BASE
AFREDCOM	AIR FORCE READINESS COMMAND
AIG	ADDRESS INDICATOR GROUP
AMEMB	AMERICAN EMBASSY
AMF	ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE
AMPS	AUTOMATED MESSAGE PROCESSING SYSTEM
ANMCC	ALTERNATE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
AO	ACTION OFFICER
ASAP	AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ASD(I&L)	ASST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASD(ISA)	ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASD(M&RA)	ASD (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASD(PA)	ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASW	ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
AWACS	AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
C/A	COURSES OF ACTION
CAC	CURRENT ACTIONS CENTER
CAO SOP	CAO - STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
CAR	CURRENT ACTION REPORT
CAS	CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM
CAT	CRISIS ACTION TEAM
CCAT	CHIEF CRISIS ACTION TEAM
CCG	COMMANDANT, COAST GUARD
CCOC	CHIEF COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER
CG	COAST GUARD
CHOP	CHANGE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL
CIA	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CINC	COMMANDER IN CHIEF
CINCAD	COMMANDER IN CHIEF AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
CINCARRED	COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMY READINESS COMMAND
CINCAFRED	COMMANDER IN CHIEF AIR FORCE READINESS COMMAND
CINCPAC	COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
CINCPACFLT	COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET
CINCRED	COMMANDER IN CHIEF READINESS COMMAND
CINCUNC	COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
CJCS	CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CMC	COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS
CMG	CONTINGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP
CNM	CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL
CNO	CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

COC	COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER
COMIPAC	COMMANDER IN THE PACIFIC, INTELLIGENCE
COMSC	COMMANDER, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
COMSPOT	COMMUNICATIONS SPOT REPORT
COMSTAT	COMMUNICATIONS STATUS REPORT
COMUSK	COMMANDER US FORCES, KOREA
COMUSKOREA	COMMANDER US FORCES, KOREA
CONPLAN	CONCEPT PLAN
CONUS	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
COPG	CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS PLANNERS GROUP
CPX	COMMAND POST EXERCISE
CRIMREP	CRISIS MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REPORT
CSP	CRISIS STAFFING PROCEDURES
CSS	CONTINGENCY SUPPORT STAFF
CTG	CARRIER TASK GROUP
CVA	ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER
DASD(A)	DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ADMINISTRATION)
DCA	DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DCI	DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DCOPG	DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OPERATIONS PLANNERS GROUP
DCPA	DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY
DDO(NMCC)	DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER)
DEFCON	DEFENSE READINESS CONDITION
DEPREP	DEPLOYMENT REPORTING SYSTEM
DFPA	DIRECTOR FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY
DIA	DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DICO	DATA INFORMATION COORDINATION OFFICE
DISUM	DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
DJS	DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
DMA	DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
DMZ	DEMILITARIZED ZONE
DNA	DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
DOD	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOT	DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DSA	DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY
DSAA	DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
DTG	DATE TIME GROUP
EA	EMERGENCY ACTION
EAP	EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES
ECG	EMERGENCY COORDINATION GROUP
EDT	EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME
EMAS	EXERCISE MESSAGE ANALYSIS SYSTEM
EMATS	EMERGENCY MSG AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
ENDEX	END OF EXERCISE
EOP	EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES

ETA	ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL
EUMEAF	EUROPE/MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA DIVISION
EXPLAN	EXERCISE PLAN
EXWSAG	EXERCISE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
FAA	FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
FPA	FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY
GMT	GREENWICH MEAN TIME
H.I.	HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
ICTF	INTERAGENCY CRISIS TASK FORCE
ID	INCREASE DEPLOYABILITY
INSIT	INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT
JCS	JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JECG	JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP
JEM	JOINT EXERCISE MANUAL
JMPAB	JOINT MATERIAL PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION BOARD
JOPS	JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM
JRS	JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE
JTB	JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD
LD	LOADED DEPLOYABILITY
LDP	LOADED DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE
LERTCON	ALERT CONDITION
LST	TANK LANDING SHIP
MAC	MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND
MAF	MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MAP	MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
MC	MARINE CORPS
MC	MESSAGE CENTER
MD	MARSHALLED DEPLOYABILITY
MNCS	MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
MOE	MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
MSC	MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
MSEL	MASTER SCENARIO EVENT LIST
MTMC	MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NAVFORK	NAVAL FORCES KOREA
NCA	NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
NCS	NET CONTROL STATION
ND	NORMAL DEPLOYABILITY
NEACP	NATIONAL EMERGENCY AIRBORNE COMMAND POST
NEMVAC	NON-ESSENTIAL MILITARY EVACUATION
NK	NORTH KOREA
NMCC	NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
NMCS	NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM
NOPLAN	NO PLAN EXISTING
NSA/CSS	NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
NSC	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
O	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE
OAG	OPERATIONS ACTION GROUP

OI	OPERATING INSTRUCTION
OJCS	ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ONPG	OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
OPG	OPERATIONS PLANNERS GROUP
OPLAN	OPERATION PLAN
OPORD	OPERATION ORDER
OPREP	OPERATIONS REPORT
OPSTAT	OPERATIONAL STATUS REPORT
OSD	OFFICE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OASD(I&L)	OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
OASD(M&RA)	OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
OASD(C)	OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
OASD(ISA)	OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
OT	OPERATIONS TEAM
P	PRIORITY PRECEDENCE
PAC	PACIFIC
PACAF	PACIFIC AIR FORCE
PACFLT	PACIFIC FLEET
PACOM	PACIFIC COMMAND
PL	PUBLIC LAW
POE	PORT OF EMBARKATION
POLCAP	PETROLEUM CAPABILITIES REPORT
PRC	PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
R	ROUTINE PRECEDENCE
RATT	RADIO TELETYPE
RCA	RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
RECAT	RESIDUAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TEAM
ROE	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
ROK	REPUBLIC OF KOREA
ROKG	REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT
SAC	STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
SECDEF	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SITREP	COMMANDER'S SITUATION REPORT
SJCS	SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SK	SOUTH KOREA
SCA	STATUS OF ACTIONS
SOAO	STATUS OF ACTIONS OFFICER
SOD	SPECIAL OPERATION DETACHMENT
SPECAT	SPECIAL CATEGORY
SPIREP	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SQDN	SQUADRON
STARTEX	START OF EXERCISE
STATE	DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRATRECONCEN	STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE CENTER
TAC	TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
TAS	TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRON
TFS	TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON
TOA	1- TIME OUT OF AMPS
	2- TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AGENCY
TOF	TIME OF FILE
TOR	TIME OF RECEIPT
TRS	TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON
TSC	TRANSPORTABLE SPECIAL COMMUNICATION DEVICE
UN	UNITED NATIONS
USA	UNITED STATES ARMY
USAF	UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
USARJ	US ARMY, JAPAN
USCG	US COAST GUARD
USCINCSO	COMMANDER IN CHIEF SOUTHERN COMMAND
USN	UNITED STATES NAVY
USNS	UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIP
USS	UNITED STATES SHIP
USREDCOM	UNITED STATES READINESS COMMAND
USSUPP	UNITED STATES SUPPLEMENT
VCOPG	VICE CHAIRMAN OPERATIONS PLANNERS GROUP
WD	WHITE DOT
WESTPAC	WESTERN PACIFIC
WPR	WAR POWERS REPORTING
WRM	1- WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS
	2- WAR RESERVE MATERIAL
WSAG	WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
WWMCCS	WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
Z	FLASH PRECEDENCE

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

(1) The CAS flow model accurately described the events of the exercise. While some meetings and messages were out of sequential order, this could be explained by the artificial situation that existed at the beginning of the exercise.

(2) Taskings emanating from the EXWSAG were processed by the exercise Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the WWMCCS, in a responsive manner.

    (a) All of the four EXWSAG taskings with suspense times assigned were responded to within the time frame established.

    (b) Of the remaining 35 EXWSAG tasks, 26 were completed prior to the next EXWSAG meeting; three more were completed and presented at a later EXWSAG meeting; two were still working at ENDEX; three were not traceable; and one was not staffed due to an exercise artificiality.

(1) The innovative procedures implemented during the exercise to expedite staff actions were effective.

(b) Connecting the OPG printer immediately after CAT implementation provided the CAT members message copies considerably quicker than in previous exercises when they were received via the CAC.

(c) CAT/OPG personnel performed the function of assigning actions to the response cells with no difficulty.

(d) The SOA report prepared by the CAT/OPG was more effective than the CAR in providing current information on the status of actions.

(a) Hourly message rate.

(b) Number of active actions.

(c) Percentage of each day's message traffic by security classification.

(d) Percentage of each day's message traffic by precedence level.

(e) The Joint Chiefs of Staff imposed DEFCON level.

(f) Number of "J sends" messages.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. (U) References

a. Annex G, Analysis and Evaluation Plan JCS EXPLAN 0007, Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75, 1 August 1975.

b. Chapter 10, Volume 1, Joint Exercise Manual (JEM).

2. (U) Background. Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75 was one of a series of annual region-oriented, JCS-sponsored CPXs. It was designed to:

a. Provide for the participation of senior Government officials.

b. Exercise civilian and military staffs and appropriate plans.

c. Test contingency management procedures.

d. Identify operational indicators or weaknesses which may adversely impact upon mission accomplishments.

e. Evaluate selected portions of the WWMCCS during a simulated period of deteriorating politico-military relations.

STARTEX was designed as a no-notice concept within a 6-week vulnerability period beginning 1 September 1975. Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75 was conducted 8-12 September 1975.

a. The analysis and evaluation plan for Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75 identifies the following specific systems and procedures for analysis:

b. The specific measures of effectiveness chosen for each objective are published in reference a. The assumptions, observations, and analysis for each measure are treated separately.

Figure 1-1. Information and Processing Flow for WSAG Taskings(U)

6. (U) <u>IVORY HUNTER 75 Analysis</u>. The EP&A Division,
Operations Directorate, OJCS was responsible for the planning,
data collection, and analysis report for Exercise IVORY
HUNTER 75.

a. <u>Analysis Plan</u>. Reference 1a contains the analysis
plan. This plan describes each system to be evaluated,
specific measures of effectiveness for each functional
area, and data collector responsibilities. The data
collection plan identified required data elements, where
the data were to be collected, how the data were to be
assembled, and the data forms to be used.

b. <u>Data Collectors</u>. The OJCS deployed data collectors
to PACOM, USREDCOM, AFREDCOM (TAC), and MAC, but
concentrated its main effort within the NMCC.

(1) Training for the data collectors was conducted
prior to the exercise. Data were collected from
command centers, special action crisis staffing teams,
response cells, communication facilities, and other
pertinent areas.

(2) The dynamic nature of the EXWSAG generated informa-
tion requirements in an unpredictable manner. Thus, it
was not possible to pre-position data collectors
within the WWMCCS to directly observe all the events
associated with a specific EXWSAG taskings.

c. <u>Data Collected</u>. The data collection effort was
concerned with obtaining exercise documents and recording
exercise events throughout the decisionmaking chain.
Observations made by the OJCS data collectors at the
various command levels were a prime data source. The
following data were also collected:

(1) Message logs from the NMCC Operations Team, EA
room, participating command centers and supporting
agencies.

(2) Copies of all exercise messages received by the NMCC
CWO on the exercise and realworld AMP printers.

(3) Copies of NMCC exercise memorandums.

(4) Copies of NMCC prepared exercise fact sheets and
working papers.

(5) Copies of significant events charts maintained in the SAR.

(6) Copies of NMCC briefing charts and scripts.

(7) The WSAG book--a volume prepared for the CJCS containing responses to EXWSAG taskings.

(8) Data collector notes of meetings and briefings.

(9) Status of Action logs and working files.

(10) All minutes and observer notes recorded at EXWSAG meetings.

(11) Data collection requirements particular to each objective analyzed in this report will be found in the appropriate chapters.

d. Exercise Message Analysis System (EMAS). The EMAS, a computerized system designed to assist in the analysis of the large volume of message traffic generated by exercises such as IVORY HUNTER 75 was used in this analysis. The major capabilities of this system are:

(1) Collect and store exercise messages and related data.

(2) Provide selective message retrieval.

(3) Make specified computations, correlations, and comparisons.

The EMAS contains the complete text of exercise message. Timing statistics derived from exercise messages are stored with other key data elements extracted from this traffic. The latter include: type of message, report type, the originator of the message, precedence, classification, readdressal information, and message processing times.

CHAPTER 2

CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM

1. .(U) References:

a. Joint Operational Planning Crisis and Emergencies, The Crisis Action System (CAS), 1 August 1975 (Draft).

b. ANNEX G to JCS EXPLAN 0007, Analysis and Evaluation Plan, 1 August 1975.

2. (U) General. The CAS provides a procedural framework within which actions are taken, decisions made, and reports submitted by the various echelons and units within the Military Services and Defense agencies during periods of crisis. (A crisis is defined as an emergency situation which may require US military operations.) The CAS encompasses all actions taken from the inception of a crisis situation through resolution. It provides for the reporting of pertinent data to and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist in: the development of situation assessments and recommended military courses of action; crisis planning, and the execution of the plans developed to manage the crisis.

a. The structure of CAS is intended to be flexible in order that accelerated responses may be taken by each level of decisionmaking authority to deal with the crisis, as conditions dictate. In addition, CAS can be used in both short-term and long-term crisis situations. The CAS is intended to accommodate the complexity of military planning and phased implementation of operational plans which is directly related to the seriousness of the crisis and the need for timely action. Thus, CAS was developed to:

(1) Speed up the transmission and exchange of pertinent data.

(2) Improve assessment of crisis situations.

(3) Improve planning by providing more timely data for the development of feasible courses of action.

(4) Improve the quality of data provided decisionmakers within the CAS.

(5) Expedite and facilitate coordination.

3. (U) System Description. The CAS is structured into six
phases, Figure 2-1. Each phase commences with either an
action, an order, or an event. Phases one through five end
with a decision. Ideally, each element of CAS will be used
to manage the situation. However, the seriousness of a
crisis may lead to bypassing intermediate actions and
the compression of most of the CAS phases into a single
phase—Execution. Figure 2-1 also illustrates the use
in CAS of critical decision points—where decisions must be
made either to continue the planning, hold at a certain phase,
or revert to a previous planning phase. ADP support, as de-
scribed in JOPS, including DEPREP, is utilized as appropriate.
The phases in CAS are:

   a. Phase I--Situation Development. Situation development
represents the detection of a condition with possible
national implications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are ad-
vised, by the most rapid means, of the possible crisis.
The appropriate commander assesses the situation to deter-
mine if a problem involving US interests exists. He for-
wards his proposed actions under his current ROE, and identi-
fies local forces available and time required for deployment.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review and assess the sup-
ported commander's data submission together with other data
available and decide if a potential military problem exists.
They submit their evaluation to the NCA.

   b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. Phase II covers the criti-
cal processes of: (1) determining if a crisis is continuing
to develop and (2) preparing an assessment which will
result in the imposition of crisis procedures on affected
commands. The intensity of reporting is increased to pro-
vide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information necessary
to develop staff positions and make valid recommendations
to the NCA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assess the military
implications and formulate guidance for the appropriate
commander of the unified and specified command. Based upon
the decision reached, a WARNING ORDER is developed for
release to appropriate commands and agencies.

   c. Phase III--Planning. After the decision is made
to declare a crisis situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
publish a WARNING ORDER. This order informs the supported
commander as to which tentative missions, if any, are to be
planned and provides him with all pertinent information
available at the JCS level. The supported commander devel-
ops an estimate based on an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or NOPLAN

situation. First, the supported commander modifies or de-
velops notional force lists for each course of action and
forwards them to supporting commanders, TOAs, and the
Services. Here they are reviewed, validated, and assigned
actual units for inclusion in the plan. The Services and
the TOAs provide additional assistance, as required, to aid
the supported commander and validate the feasibility of each
course of action. After considering all factors, the sup-
ported commander submits his estimate, including recommended
courses of action, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The sup-
ported commander at this time will implement appropriate
DEPREP procedures as directed in the WARNING ORDER, depending
upon the planning time available.

d. Phase IV--Decision. After review and approval of the con-
cepts proposed by the supported commander, action is taken by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to refine and present courses of
action to the NCA for decision. The NCA assesses the plans
and informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the desired course
of action with appropriate constraints. Upon notification
of the decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare and issue
an ALERT ORDER to the supported commander, supporting commands,
the Services, and participating agencies.

e. Phase V--Execution Planning. Execution planning is that
part of the CAS cycle which translates the decision devel-
oped in Phase IV into an OPORD which can be executed at a
designated time. The OPORD contains an actual troop list,
a firm movement plan, and coordinating, logistics, and ad-
ministrative instructions. All factors having a significant
effect on mission accomplishment are reconsidered by the sup-
ported commander in light of the prevailing situation and
mission assignment. The need for a continuing exchange of
data between the supported commander and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is implied. This phase ends with the decision to exe-
cute or to hold pending resolution of the crisis by means
other than military intervention.

f. Phase VI--Execution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
reflecting the decisions of the NCA, order the supported
commander to execute the OPORD in this phase. Upon execu-
tion of the OPORD, the CAS terminates or is used to address
a secondary crisis, and the operation is controlled through
command-unique, WWMCCS-related, command and control systems.

4. (U) The CAS in IVORY HUNTER. During this exercise five
phases of the CAS were identified as having occurred.
Figure 2-2 shows the times associated with the five phases

Figure 2-2. CAS Phases -- Start/End Times and Significant Actions/Events. (U)

which were exercised, and the important events within each phase.

a. Elements within Phase I, e.g., problem recognition, assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA, and problem definition, were identified by specific messages or actions which were readily documented. However, the events were not in precise stepping-stone order as they either overlapped one another in time or, in some instances, occurred in reverse chronological order. This latter situation happened during the first EXWSAG meeting when the crisis assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NCA, was made at 090030Z September 1975 before the supported commander's assessment arrived at 091800Z September 1975. This deviation from the expected sequence of events is attributable to the nature of the exercise. STARTEX occurred with the implementation of the CAT, and as the scenario indicated, the crisis already was partially developed when the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA first met.

b. Timing points for the CAS phases were determined as follows:

(1) Phase I. STARTEX was assigned near the beginning of Phase I. The first EXWSAG meeting requested additional information and instructed that several key operational units be alerted. These events were associated with problem recognition and the decision that a problem existed.

(2) Phase II. JCS Pub 6 requires that upon increased readiness to DEFCON 3:

(a) Unified and specified commands submit SITREPs daily as of 2400Z to insure receipt at OJCS not later than 0400Z the following day.

(b) The Services submit daily reports as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at the discretion of the Services, as of 2400Z to insure receipt at OJCS not later than 0400Z the following day.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred at 090900Z September 1975 in CINCPAC's earlier declaration of DEFCON 3. The increase in reporting requirements which followed is associated with the beginning of CAS Phase II. Later, the EXWSAG met at 091800Z September 1975 and requested status of forces, deployment postures, possible NEMVAC

plans and other crisis related information. This meeting
signaled recognition of the crisis situation, a decision
which marks the termination of Phase II.

(3) Phase III. The JCS WARNING ORDER 101000Z September
1975 initiated Phase III. CINCPAC responded with his es-
timate of the situation 110951Z September 1975. Phase
III ended when the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a briefing
121100Z September 1975 recommended adoption to the EXWSAG,
of CINCPAC's Course of Action II, somewhat modified.

(4) Phase IV. Phase IV consisted entirely of the EXWSAG
deliberations with respect to the course of action recom-
mended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The beginning of
the phase was marked by an EXWSAG meeting convened at
121300Z September 1975, almost immediately after adjourn-
ment of the meeting which ended Phase III. The EXWSAG
reviewed and recommended adoption of CINCPAC Course of
Action II--minus the III MAF and the 25th Infantry Divi-
sion. The meeting adjourned at 121430Z September 1975,
which completed the actions under Phase IV.

(5) Phase V. Phase V began with the JCS ALERT ORDER of
122030Z September 1975 and continued until ENDEX was sig-
naled at 122158Z September 1975.

c. It is apparent that the CAS procedures do not account for
two distinct time periods. First, Phase II concluded at
091800Z September 1975 and Phase III started at 101000Z
September 1975--a difference of 16 hours. This time was
allocated to the preparation, coordination, and issuance of
the JCS WARNING ORDER. Secondly, there was a 6 hour interval
between the end of Phase IV and the beginning of Phase V.
This interval is similar to the first as it represents pro-
cessing time associated with the development of the ALERT
ORDER. These two time intervals were significant since they
accounted for almost 22 hours (or 23 percent) of Exercise
IVORY HUNTER 75.

Table 2-1. Summary of EXW&AG Tasking with Suspenses (U)

Table 2-2.   Summary ... ... g Without Suspense (U)

Table 2-3. Summary of EXWSAG Taskings by CAS Phase (U)

Table 2-4. Number of Responses to EXWSAG by Subject Area (U)

Figure 2-13. Warning Order Elapsed Times--Significant Events (U)

Table 2-5. Crisis Action System Procedural Review—
Events Not Accomplished as Described in the CAS (U)

Table 2-6. Crisis Action System Procedural Utilization Summary--
by Level of Command (U)

Table 2-7. Procedures Utilized During Each CAS Phase--
by Level of Command (U)

Table 2-8.   Major Units Considered for Deployment (U)

Table 2-9. DEFCONs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Exercise Equivalents (U)

CHAPTER 3

CRISIS STAFFING PROCEDURES

1. (U) Introduction. The CSP provides a guideline for the
contingency organization and manning at the NMCC and ANMCC,
during periods of crisis, which range from normal day-to-
day manning through implementation of the EOP. The CSP
assessed during IVORY HUNTER were those specified in the
following references, which were promulgated prior to the
exercise:

   a. The 4th flimsy of the revision of the EOP of the Joint
   Chiefs of Staff (U), 1 August 1975.

   b. Change 1 to the 4th flimsy of the revision of the EOP
   of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U), 5 September 1975.

CLASSIFIED BY CHIEF, EP&A DIV
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON ~~DECEMBER~~

OADR

3. (U) <u>Performance Objectives and Analysis Measures</u>. JCS
EXPLAN 0007 specified the aspects of the CSP evaluation and the
areas to be assessed.

   a. <u>Performance Objectives</u>. The objectives defined for CSP
   pre-EOP/EOP were timeliness, accuracy, and data sufficiency,
   in terms of functional effectiveness and procedural compliance.

   b. <u>Analysis Measures</u>. The measures specified for analysis
   were:

      (1) The compliance with procedures for activating and
      organizing the pre-EOP level response groups.

      (2) The effectiveness of procedures implemented to
      expedite staff actions.

      (3) The adequacy of procedures for monitoring, controlling,
      coordinating, and executing action implementers during
      crisis/emergency situations.

      (4) The effectiveness of the staff organization as imple-
      mented.

      (5) The adequacy of notification and activation procedures.

      (6) The level of extraneous data and information required
      and reported.

      (7) The level of management control maintained through-
   out the transition from pre-EOP to EOP.

Figure 3-1. Manning Specified in CSP Phases (U)

(8) The compliance with EOP activation procedures.

(9) The effectiveness of the reporting, coordinating, and processing of actions.

Table 3-1. Messages Received Prior to STARTEX (U)

Table 3-2. Receipt Times of Exercise Start Messages (U)

c. Compliance with Procedures. This aspect was analyzed by evaluating the pre-EOP and EOP activation, the interfaces with the WSAG, and the timing of the EOP implementation decision.

Table 3-3. Deviations from Staffing Specified in CSP (U)

(3) <u>Innovative Procedures</u>. The following unplanned
innovative procedures were implemented during the
exercise and appeared to work well.

Table 3-4. EXWSAG Actions Assigned to CAT/OPG (U)

Table 3-5. JCS Outgoing Messages Not Received
Over the "OPG" AMPS Printer (U)

(b) Assignment of Actions by CAT/OPG. Actions
during this exercise were assigned by the CAT/OPG
instead of by members of the SJCS. As a result,
there was no requirement for SJCS personnel in the
CAT/OPG area. This helped to reduce the congestion
that has been a problem during previous exercises.

Table 3-6. Ad Hoc Committee Manning--Specified vs Provided (U)

Table 3-7. EOP Implementation Notification by Telephone (U)

Table 3-8. EOP Implementation Notification by Memorandum (U)

Figure 3-4. Percentage of Each Days Messages
by Security Classifications (U)

Figure 3-5. Percentage of Each Days Messages
by Precedence (U)

Figure 3-3. Cumulative Number of Messages (1)

Table 3-9. Date Time Groups of "J Sends" Messages
Relative to Time of EOP Implementation (U)

Table 3-10. Transition of Personnel--Percent of Carry-Over (U)

Figure 3-6. Number of Open Actions in SOA Reports (U)

Figure 3 7, Total and Completed Actions from SOA Reports (U)

Table 3-11. Number of Actions Concerned with Subject (U)

Table 3-12. Status of Action Reports - When Required and When Published (U)

4. (U) JRS Analysis. The JRS reporting during IVORY HUNTER was analyzed against the objectives and criteria described above and SOS objectives. The latter are shown below in Table 4-1. (Note: The SOS objectives include both transmission and administrative processing times. The overall IVORY HUNTER writer-to-reader times were not computed because data were not available to measure administrative processing times. This deficiency is not believed to affect materially the conclusions of the analysis. The analysis of IVORY HUNTER JRS message traffic therefore, compares TOF-TOA against the SOS objectives. The communications elements; e.g., TOF, TOA, TOR, and DTG, are discussed later under the subheading, Message Transmission Times by Precedence.) The specific reports examined are discussed under the major categories of the JRS.

PRECEDENCE	SPEED OF SERVICE OBJECTIVES
FLASH	ASAP with an objective of 10 minutes or less
IMMEDIATE	30 minutes
PRIORITY	3 hours
ROUTINE	6 hours

Source: ACP 121, US SUPP-1 (U)

Table 4-1. Writer-to-Reader Speed-of-Service Objectives (U)

a. CAOSOP Reports. Since there was no exercise of nuclear force systems and procedures during IVORY HUNTER, CAOSOP reporting was not implemented.

b. Operational Status Reports. Three reports in this category were exercised and analyzed--OPREP, SITREP, and OPSTAT. Message traffic for these reports represented more than two-thirds (213) of the JRS message traffic (310) analyzed. Only one OPREP 5 report was sent.

(1) OPREP-1. All five Operation Planning Reports (OPREP-1) submitted during the exercise (Table 4-2) came from the Strategic Reconnaissance Center, Offutt AFB. Only two of these reports met the communications SOS objective for IMMEDIATE precedence messages. The average TOR to TOA of 2 minutes indicates relatively brief queue times for this precedence at the NMCC.

(2) OPREP-3. The 51 OPREP-3 reports received in the NMCC were transmitted using all four message precedences (Table 4-2).

(a) The average TOF to TOA for OPREP-3 FLASH messages was 24 minutes, which fails to meet the SOS objective of 10 minutes or less. The average queue time at the NMCC (TOR to TOA) of 2 minutes indicates that most of the transmission time is consumed prior to arrival of the message at the NMCC.

(b) Similarly, the average TOF to TOA for OPREP-3 messages sent by IMMEDIATE precedence was more than twice as long (67 minutes) as the SOS objective of 30 minutes or less. Again, the queue time at the NMCC averaged only 3 minutes, indicating most of the transmission time was consumed elsewhere in the system.

(c) The average TOF to TOA for OPREP-3 reports sent by PRIORITY precedence was 132 minutes (Table 4-2). This was less than the maximum 180 minutes established as the PRIORITY SOS objective. The average queue time was 18 minutes.

(d) Only one OPREP-3 report was submitted using ROUTINE precedence.

(3) SITREP. SITREPs were transmitted using IMMEDIATE, PRIORITY, and ROUTINE precedence.

(a) The average TOF to TOA (27 minutes) for SITREP IMMEDIATE messages was within the immediate SOS objective.

(b) The average TOF to TOA for SITREP PRIORITY messages (48 minutes) was almost twice that for SITREP IMMEDIATE (27 minutes). This was still considerably faster than the established SOS for PRIORITY messages. Again, average queue time (8 minutes) at the NMCC appeared to be relatively brief.

Table 4-2. JRS Reports Summary, Message Transmission by
Precedence, Elapsed Mean Time (in minutes) (U)

(c) Only one SITREP was transmitted by ROUTINE precedence.

(4) OPSTAT. A large number of OPSTAT reports were received in the NMCC from US Air Force units.

(a) There were 113 OPSTAT reports transmitted by IMMEDIATE precedence (Table 4-2). The average TOF to TOA (56 minutes) was nearly double the SOS objective for IMMEDIATE precedence (30 minutes). Average queue time in the NMCC (TOR to TOA) was only 2 minutes.

(b) Eight OPSTAT reports were transmitted by PRIORITY precedence. The average TOF to TOA for PRIORITY was only 5 minutes longer than that for IMMEDIATE. Average queue time for PRIORITY (9 minutes) was more than four times as long as IMMEDIATE (2 minutes). The average SOS (TOF to TOA) for OPSTAT PRIORITY reports (61 minutes) was approximately one-third the SOS objective of 180 minutes.

c. Situation Monitoring Reports. Three reports in this category were exercised and analyzed--SPIREP, INTSIT, and DISUM.

(1) SPIREP. The average TOF to TOA for SPIREP IMMEDIATE messages (17 minutes) was well within the IMMEDIATE SOS objective (Table 4-2). Similarly, the average SOS for SPIREP PRIORITY messages was nine times faster (20 minutes) than the PRIORITY SOS objective of 3 hours. The maximum TOF to TOA for SPIREP PRIORITY messages was 3 hours and 20 minutes (Table 4-3)--only 20 minutes longer than the SOS objective.

(2) INTSIT. The timeliness of INTSIT IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY messages (Table 4-2) was better than the objective criteria.

(3) DISUM. All DISUM IMMEDIATE messages were received within the SOS objective of 30 minutes (Table 4-3). All DISUM PRIORITY messages arrived earlier than the established SOS objective; three were submitted by USARJ, and two by COMIPAC.

d. Operational Support Monitoring Reports. Three reports in this category were exercised and analyzed--COMSTAT, COMSPOT, and POLCAP.

(1) All COMSTAT reports were transmitted using PRIORITY precedence; all were originated by DCA, Washington, D. C.; and all met the SOS standard. The average TOF to TOA was 35 minutes; the maximum, 72 minutes--against an objective of 3 hours (Table 4-3).

Table 4-3. JRS Reports Summary, Message Transmission
by Precedence, Minimum - Maximum Times
(in minutes) (U)

(2) All COMSPOT messages were orginated by DCA, PAC, Kunia, H. I.; all were transmitted using IMMEDIATE precedence. The average TOF to TOA (16 minutes) was well within the IMMEDIATE SOS objective. However, the maximum TOF to TOA was 144 minutes and failed to meet the SOS objective.

(3) There were insufficient POLCAP reports transmitted to draw statistical conclusions on timeliness.

Table 4-4. Messages Originated by Major Commands and Agencies (U)

Table 4-5. Percent Security Classification by Precedence (U)

Figure 4-2. Message Traffic by Day, Precedence, and Classification (U)

Figure 4-3. Average Communication Transmission Times to the NMCC MC for FLASH Precedence (U)

Figure 4-4. Average Communication Transmission Times to
the NMCC MC for IMMEDIATE Precedence (U)

Figure 4-5. Average Communication Transmission Times to
the NMCC MC for PRIORITY Precedence (U)

Figure 4-6. TOF to TOA--Cumulative Distributions by Message Precedence (U)

Table 4-6. Average Incoming Message Transmission and NMCC MC Queue Times in Minutes by Precedence (U)

Figure 4-7. Communications Elements--Cumulative Distributions for FLASH Precedence (U)

Table 4-7. Transmission Times Required to Account
for Variation in TOF-TOA (U) ,

Table 4-8.   Length of FLASH Messages (U)

Table 4-9. Length of IMMEDIATE Messages (U)

Table 4-10. Duplication of Exercise Messages (U)

Table 4-It. Average Daily Message Traffic by Type—Comparison of Exercises and Real World Crises (U)

Table 4-12. Message Traffic, Exercise Versus Real World (U)

CHAPTER 5

WAR POWERS REPORTING

1. (U) <u>Introduction</u>. The "War Powers Resolution" is the short title for the House of Representatives Joint Resolution Number 542 voted by the 93rd Congress of the United States. This resolution became PL 93-148 on 7 November 1973. The purpose of the law is to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations."

a. PL 93-148 requires that the President report to the Congress within 48 hours when US Armed Forces are introduced:

(1) Into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

(2) Into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.

(3) In numbers which substantially enlarge US Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.

b. The Congress requires special information elements concerning forces deployed, to include:

(1) The circumstances necessitating the introduction of US Armed Forces.

(2) The constitutional and legislative authority under which such introductions took place.

(3) The estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

c. In addition, the President must be prepared to supply Congress any other data they may request in fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of the US Armed Forces abroad.

OADR

d. The President is required to report periodically on the status of U.S. Armed Forces, as well as on the scope and duration, as long as those forces continue to be engaged in hostilities or in situations. In no event shall he report to Congress less often than once every 6 months.

2. (U) <u>War Powers Reporting System Description.</u> Responding to PL 93-148 requirements, the War Powers Reporting System of the OJCS established procedures for notifying the CJCS when US Armed Forces are introduced into situations where Presidential reporting to Congress, in accordance with the law, might be appropriate.

a. The War Powers Reporting System is described in detail in OJCS, J-3 Instruction (J3I) 3000.1A, 2 December 1974, "War Powers Reporting System." Figure 5-1 provides a flow chart of these procedures, which are summarized as follows:

(1) Each force movement message staffed or approved by a J-3 action officer, Division Chief, or Deputy Director is reviewed by the action officer to determine WPR applicability.

(2) When Presidential reporting to Congress is considered applicable, the action agency insures that:

(a) The OJCS Summary Sheet accompanying the deployment implementer is annotated with the words "Presidential reporting to Congress, in compliance with PL 93-148 might be appropriate;" or

(b) A memorandum to the CJCS is prepared, noting the movement of forces and the requirement for movement reporting under PL 93-148. The memorandum is forwarded to the CJCS with a copy of the implementing message.

(c) All cases of doubt are staffed in favor of recommending WPR pending higher level resolution.

(3) The action agency further insures that the initial report detailing the deployments, and a transmittal memorandum forwarding the initial report to the Secretary of Defense, accompanies or follows the OJCS deployment notification. The initial report provides the following data:

AO's, Division Chiefs & DDO's review force movements for WP reporting

Clear WPR Situation

A. WPR required when armed forces introduced

into hostilities or imminent involvement

OR

into foreign territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat

OR

in numbers which substantially enlarge U.S. armed forces

No

Yes

Submits to higher level for resolution

Recommends Reporting

Yes

No

Outgoing movement instructions screened by Mil Sec for compliance

OR

Action Division insures "Presidential reporting, in compliance with PL93-148 might be appropriate" is noted on OJCS Summary Sheet

Prepares memo to CJCS Attaching copy of Implementing message

AND

Accompanies or rapidly follows with Initial Report (see "B" below) and SecDef transmittal memo. Submits package to CJCS

B. Initial Report Contents

- Circumstances
- Nature of threat
- Interests to be protected
- Units involved
- U.S. Forces prior to introduction
- Nature of allied contribution
- Estimated outcome & termination
- Constitutional & Legislative authority

Presidents reports to Congress under PL 93-148

SecDef advises President

CJCS reviews and transmits essential information to SecDef.

Updates Initial Report as information becomes available and submits to CJCS.

Figure 5-I.   War Powers Reporting (U)

(a) Circumstances necessitating introduction of the US Armed Forces.

(b) Nature of the threat.

(c) Interests to be protected.

(d) Units involved.

(e) US Forces prior to introduction of the new force.

(f) Nature and scope of allied contribution.

(g) Estimated outcome and expected termination.

(h) Constitutional and legislative authority.

(4) The Military Secretary screens all outgoing movement messages to commanders of unified and specified commands to insure that WPR has been considered.

(5) The action agency must further insure that the initial report is not delayed in order to complete all required reporting items and that follow-on or amplifying reports are submitted as additional information becomes available.

b. The NMCC OI 3000.8, 19 January 1975, requires the NMCS to coordinate requests for movement or commitment of US Forces and for reporting this movement to Congress when required by the WPR. This document supports J3I 3000.1A.

4. (U) Analysis Approach. For this analysis, pertinent imple-
menting documents concerning deployment of forces were reviewed
for content and applicability to the WPR. The WPR memorandum
prepared during the exercise was traced through the various steps
of the staffing process and reviewed against the analysis measures
indicated above. The legal counsel to the CJCS was consulted for
interpretation of applicability of deploying focuses identified
in the exercise to the WPR to resolve areas of ambiguity.

Table 5-1. WPR--Deployments of Forces Directed by 101310Z
(Time SECDEF Received Initial War Powers Report)(U)

Table 5-2. WPR--Partial Listing of Forces Directed
After 101310Z (U)

APPENDIX B

CAS DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE

EXERCISE IVORY HUNTER 75

1. (U) Deployability Postures. Deployability posture is the state or stage of a unit's preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation. The following five levels are defined in CAS:

a. Normal Deployability Posture (ND). Unit conducting normal activities. Commanders monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station will report:

(1) Scheduled closure time at home station.

(2) Time required to return home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation is available.

b. Increased Deployability Posture (ID). Unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as required, to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Predeployment personnel actions completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at CONUS or overseas installations identified.

c. Advanced Deployability Posture (AD). All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. Unit remains at home station.

d. Marshalled Deployability Posture (MD). First increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies marshalled at designated ports of embarkation (POEs) but not loaded. Aircraft and/or ships to transport first increment assembled at POE but not loaded.

e. Loaded Deployability Posture (LD). All equipment and accompanying supplies of first increment loaded aboard aircraft and/or ships and prepared for departure to designated objective area. Personnel prepared for loading on minimum notice.